Fascinating discussion. I've read it twice, and am still chewing on it. I've wrestled with some of these issues too over the years. We've gone in different directions and still ended up with points of agreement, including the need to overturn Greek philosophy.
For me, the challenge has been from moral objectivists presenting their view as either the only possible view of morality, or as a three-way split between moral objectivism, moral relativism, and moral nihilism. Moral objectivism is the position that moral demands exist on their own, independent of a commanding agent. Moral relativism is repudiated but never well defined. It seems to exist across a spectrum running from "different rules for different cultures"-- approximately what you call relativism, but based on the mores for different ethnic or religious peoplehoods rather than on different social estates within one nation-- to "I don't have a defined religion or tribe, so I get to decide my own moral rules"-- what you call subjectivism. Moral nihilism is the belief, on surveying the vacuity of the other two options, that there is no such thing as morality.
The position I've come to is that there is a third mode beyond objective and subjective, which I call 'interpersonal,' and that is where morality and language both live. This is the field upon which agents meet to work out issues in a cooperative way. Linguistic objectivism is the belief, with a couple of Mark Twain's characters, that words have an objective meaning, and if the French call a cow a 'vache,' then the French are objectively wrong, because everyone knows that the word for a cow is 'cow.' Linguistic subjectivist relativism is the Lewis Carroll view that "when I use a word, it means exactly what I intend it to mean, neither more nor less."
In an interpersonal domain, I don't get to make things up arbitrarily for you, nor you for me, nor is there any objective standard to appeal to other than a loose tradition. We each get our chance at input to modify an inherited protocol as we find necessary, and we respect each other's demands and choices up to the point at which we are ready to abandon the cooperative project. Linguistically, I will use words in a way that I expect you to understand if I am serious about our interpersonal project of communication.
Morality is interpersonal in the same way. It doesn't exist as some objective rule out there, nor would it be any more meaningful than an autistic child mumbling to itself if we just make up our own rules for ourselves. Morality has a cooperative purpose-- it is to keep me from acting in an obtusely selfish way that might inspire you to kill me.
As you say, morality is a demand, not a proposition. As the moral subjectivist says, we each decide our own moral rules. But, contrary to the subjectivist, it is not our own rules we must abide by. If we are to get along, then I must live up to your minimal standards, and you must live up to mine. To me, this seems to be the essence of morality.
The dichotomy is between objectivity and subjectivity, not objectivity and relativism. Relativism says that it is objectively true that there are different morals for different people.
The key is in seeing that morality is not a kind of knowledge, but a command. Commands are by nature relative to the one being commanded—your father might command you to take out the garbage but not your mother.
And yet a command is even more objective than a truth statement, in that it's issued from outside the subject (necessarily, by definition), and is not up for debate the way a statement of fact might be. This makes morality relative, and yet even more objective than propositional (universal) morality could ever hope to be.
This put me in mind of the American general John Pershing during the Great War. He ignored the advice of experienced British and French officers and sent men straight across the no-man land in face of the machine guns. He thought courage was more important than strategy. Thousands of men were killed and maimed for no good reason. He have the command but his command was not apt to the situation. Authority cannot afford to be blind.
As war requires a nation to be youthful, strong, bright, fruitful, and well-invested in the future of the state, the law and norms must be apt for the people. They cannot be used as Issac on the altar of pretty theory and sentiment, if you want to win wars.
Fascinating discussion. I've read it twice, and am still chewing on it. I've wrestled with some of these issues too over the years. We've gone in different directions and still ended up with points of agreement, including the need to overturn Greek philosophy.
For me, the challenge has been from moral objectivists presenting their view as either the only possible view of morality, or as a three-way split between moral objectivism, moral relativism, and moral nihilism. Moral objectivism is the position that moral demands exist on their own, independent of a commanding agent. Moral relativism is repudiated but never well defined. It seems to exist across a spectrum running from "different rules for different cultures"-- approximately what you call relativism, but based on the mores for different ethnic or religious peoplehoods rather than on different social estates within one nation-- to "I don't have a defined religion or tribe, so I get to decide my own moral rules"-- what you call subjectivism. Moral nihilism is the belief, on surveying the vacuity of the other two options, that there is no such thing as morality.
The position I've come to is that there is a third mode beyond objective and subjective, which I call 'interpersonal,' and that is where morality and language both live. This is the field upon which agents meet to work out issues in a cooperative way. Linguistic objectivism is the belief, with a couple of Mark Twain's characters, that words have an objective meaning, and if the French call a cow a 'vache,' then the French are objectively wrong, because everyone knows that the word for a cow is 'cow.' Linguistic subjectivist relativism is the Lewis Carroll view that "when I use a word, it means exactly what I intend it to mean, neither more nor less."
In an interpersonal domain, I don't get to make things up arbitrarily for you, nor you for me, nor is there any objective standard to appeal to other than a loose tradition. We each get our chance at input to modify an inherited protocol as we find necessary, and we respect each other's demands and choices up to the point at which we are ready to abandon the cooperative project. Linguistically, I will use words in a way that I expect you to understand if I am serious about our interpersonal project of communication.
Morality is interpersonal in the same way. It doesn't exist as some objective rule out there, nor would it be any more meaningful than an autistic child mumbling to itself if we just make up our own rules for ourselves. Morality has a cooperative purpose-- it is to keep me from acting in an obtusely selfish way that might inspire you to kill me.
As you say, morality is a demand, not a proposition. As the moral subjectivist says, we each decide our own moral rules. But, contrary to the subjectivist, it is not our own rules we must abide by. If we are to get along, then I must live up to your minimal standards, and you must live up to mine. To me, this seems to be the essence of morality.
The dichotomy is between objectivity and subjectivity, not objectivity and relativism. Relativism says that it is objectively true that there are different morals for different people.
The key is in seeing that morality is not a kind of knowledge, but a command. Commands are by nature relative to the one being commanded—your father might command you to take out the garbage but not your mother.
And yet a command is even more objective than a truth statement, in that it's issued from outside the subject (necessarily, by definition), and is not up for debate the way a statement of fact might be. This makes morality relative, and yet even more objective than propositional (universal) morality could ever hope to be.
This put me in mind of the American general John Pershing during the Great War. He ignored the advice of experienced British and French officers and sent men straight across the no-man land in face of the machine guns. He thought courage was more important than strategy. Thousands of men were killed and maimed for no good reason. He have the command but his command was not apt to the situation. Authority cannot afford to be blind.
As war requires a nation to be youthful, strong, bright, fruitful, and well-invested in the future of the state, the law and norms must be apt for the people. They cannot be used as Issac on the altar of pretty theory and sentiment, if you want to win wars.